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Abstract: 
Since the early 1990’s, Ethiopia has been running reform programmes to improve efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability in the delivery of public services. One method has been Business 
Process Re-engineering (BPR). Using a concurrent quan-QUAL mixed study, this chapter analyzes 
two public bodies to examine whether their BPR projects have been appropriately designed and 
implemented, what has worked, what has not, and why. The finding is that BPR designs have been 
generally sound, but positive results have been prevented or compromised by a wide range of 
planning and implementation defects, including failure to institutionalize the new systems; lack of  
monitoring, measuring, and reviewing; and  an  inadequate incentive structure.  
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Introduction 
Ethiopia’s first Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) was launched in 1996 (UNDP, 
2007), designed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of public institutions. It 
included sub-programmes to reform top management systems, human resource management, service 
delivery, government expenditure and control, and ethics. In 2001, the Government also launched a 
comprehensive National Capacity Building Programme (NCBP) to strengthen working systems, 
improve organizational effectiveness, and rapidly develop human resources in the public sector (ibid). 
Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) was introduced in 2003 and was applied as part of the CSRP 
(Gebrekidan, 2011).  
There are very few studies on the outcomes and impacts of PBR reforms in Ethiopia, and 
even these provide inconclusive accounts. Some argue that BPR reforms have not brought the desired 
changes, while others indicate success stories.  World Bank (2011) suggests that effectiveness, 
efficiency and speed of service delivery in Ethiopian public bodies is much talked about but little 
achieved. There are studies indicating some improvements in service provision as a result of BPR, and 
some failures (Tilaye cited in Debela, 2009; Debela and Hagos, 2011; Teklegiorgis and Amare, 2007). 
Empirical studies on the status of BPR reforms in the Regional Government of Ethiopia are scarce.   
Focusing on the Amhara Region, this study explores the design and implementation of BPR 
programmes in two government offices in Bahir Dar town— Bahir Dar City Services Office and 
Bahir Dar University. Though the two offices provide different services, both do so to large numbers 
of customers, mobilize huge resources, and began re-engineering at the same time.  
 This study follows a mixed-methods approach, quant-QUAL, involving data collection both from 
numeric and text information either simultaneously or sequentially to best understand the research 
problem (Cresswell, 2003).This chapter’s survey respondents were selected from organizational units 
(processes) which began implementing the re-engineering projects during 2010/2011. In Bahir Dar 
University (BDU) 15 officers from the teaching/learning process and 15 case-team leaders from the 
support processes responded to the questionnaire.  At Bahir Dar City services (BDC) three case-team 
coordinators from head office and 27 officers from the kebeles responded to the questionnaire. Top-
level officials from both organizations who were actively engaged in the re-engineering process were 
interviewed. Design documents, minutes of change management committees, review documents and 
other secondary information were consulted. 
This study uses an analytical tool, which was developed and used in Botswana by Hacker and 
Washington
1
 (2004) in measuring performance of large-scale projects. It measures the performance of 
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any large-scale change through six areas: result areas and goals; objectives; measurement processes; 
reviews; responsibilities; and evidence of continuous improvement. The tool uses a survey instrument 
of 39 statements within the six headings. Respondents are asked to rate the level of implementation of 
the items on a scale from 1 (not implemented at all) to 7 (fully implemented). The reliability of the 
tool (across time and other variables) is computed using Cronbach’s alpha, with a result of 0.965 
representing a relatively high estimate (Nunnaly cited in Davis, 2000:180).  
 
I. The design and implementation of BPR in the two offices  
1 Pre-BPR  
BDU was established in 1999 by merging the then Bahir Dar Teachers’ Education and Bahir 
Dar Polytechnic Institutes. The university now has more than 40,000 students in its regular, evening, 
distance and summer programmes, which include the humanities, social sciences, natural science, 
engineering, business and economics, agriculture and environmental sciences, legal studies and 
medical and health sciences. The academic and support staff number about 2,500.  
Before BPR, the decision-making power was centrally held by the top management of the 
university, which included the President (Chief Executive Officer), Academic and Research Vice 
president, and Business and Development Vice President. Under the Academic and Research Vice 
President there were seven deans running their respective faculties. The support activities were run by 
the Finance, Administration, and General Services departments all organized under the supervision of 
the Business and Development Vice President. With the exception of student affairs and some aspects 
of staff affairs, all the powers relating to financial management and procurement were centralized at 
the top management level, especially with the President and the Vice Presidents. The Academic 
Deans of the faculties had little authority on hiring and firing of staff, management of their budget, or 
administering support staff and physical resources. They were responsible only for the day-to-day 
teaching/learning activities of their faculties. 
BDC, the regional capital of Amhara State, has an estimated 220,000 residents (2007 Ethiopia 
Statistics Authority census survey). The city has a mayor as chief administrator, different sectoral 
offices, and the city services office. Its objectives are making the city suitable for living, investment, 
and provision of social services. Major services include development and provision of land for social 
services, investments, and residential construction; building of infrastructure, beautification and 
cleansing of the city; and provision of utilities and municipal services.    
Before BPR, the BDC Services had a centralized structure and different functional 
departments. The Department Heads reported to the City Manager, who was accountable to the 
mayor. There were 17 sub-city administrators known as kebele administrators all reporting to the City 
Manager. Almost every major decision was centralized— for example, every land lease contract 
between the city and the citizen/investor had to be signed by the city manager. Service provision took 
an inordinate length of time and involved numerous procedures. For acquiring a plot of land and 
securing an approved site plan for constructing residential or commercial houses, an applicant had to 
wait for at least twelve months; in the process there were 30 different activities performed by different 
experts in different offices. Kebeles had no power with regard to provision of land, construction 
permits, collection of fees, transfer of title deeds to different parties, or delivery of utilities. Their 
authority was limited to minor issues like provision of citizen identity cards and minor dispute 
resolutions.  
 
2  BPR Design Process  
At BDU, the top management formed a team of experts and officials who identified ten 
business processes, of which five were selected for redesign based on their relative importance to the 
success of the mission of the university, the resources they consumed and the magnitude of the 
problems they faced.  These processes were: a) Teaching – Learning; b) Human Resource 
Development; c) Procurement and Property Administration; d) Planning, Implementation, Monitoring 
and Evaluation; e) Information and Strategic Communication 
The university formed a separate team for each business process and gave each team a 
“Process Owner”, who report to   the President of the university as the overall “Business Owner”. A 
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Tsar was appointed to facilitate logistics and finance operations. A Steering Committee, comprising 
the Process Owners, is chaired by the Business Owner. .   
BDU set a six-month deadline for “work units” to complete the new process designs.  The 
sudden removal of the then President and Vice President from office disrupted the timetable and there 
was an over-run of five months. Various consultation meetings were conducted to refine the draft 
designs of each process. A national workshop was held to present the new work processes and obtain 
feedback from senior officials of the Ministry of Education, other university presidents, Amhara 
region officials, and experts.  
The top management of the BDC started by conducting consultative meetings with all 
employees on the need to redesign various processes, and trained all on the principles of BPR. The 
city selected five processes for redesign – a) Land Acquisition and Administration; b) Design and 
Construction; c) Utilities Administration; d) City Beautification and Cleaning Administration; and e) 
Law Enforcement. Subsequently, BDC top management decided to re-engineer only one process - 
Land Acquisition and Administration – warranted by its strategic importance. The redesign process 
was finalized within the planned period of six months and various consultation forums that brought 
together the design team and employees were conducted. The Mayor held the position of Business 
Owner. A Tsar was also assigned. 
Both BDU and BDC adopted Linden’s (1998) methodology for introducing BPR, as 
prescribed by the central government.  This method has three fundamental principles: a) challenging 
assumptions behind the old way of doing business; b) focusing on processes, not along functional 
lines, programme offices or budget departments’; and c) organizing around outcomes.  
The general approach followed in both organizations included mapping the old ways of doing 
work, identifying problems, assessing rules), and verifying assumptions behind the rules. Desired 
outcomes of each process were articulated after focus-group discussions, interviews and surveys with 
customers and other internal and external stakeholders. The desired outcomes were converted to 
stretched objectives.  
 
3 Post-  BPR   
The implementation of BPR resulted in some changes at both the university and the city 
services. Jobs and responsibilities were redefined, the number of activities was reduced, the time for 
each activity was determined, positions were reduced, and the philosophy of doing work was 
redefined.  
As a direct result of BPR, the university made its Course System Knowledge Database 
(CSKD) permanent. Various graduate and undergraduate programmes may come and go, but the 
CSKDs from which they are derived will remain. Redesign of courses into end-to-end, holistic 
systems reduced the previous 800 separate courses to 250 CSKDs. Traditionally, courses were each 
instructor’s property; now CSKDs have their respective managers who manage, renovate, continually 
update the systems, and make them available for delivery.  
On approval of the organizational structure by the board, the university elected five Vice 
Presidents and Process Owners to lead their respective processes.  A Change Management Team 
comprising Presidents, Institutional Transformation Officers and the Tsar was formed by the President 
to lead the change. The processes have only case teams reporting to the Process Owners; no other 
hierarchy was created, enabling one-stop services. To reach their customers easily, case teams were 
located in different parts of the university campuses. The system empowered Deans of colleges as 
well as faculties and schools reorganized by the design to have discretionary power on procurement, 
financial services and maintenance services.  
BDU prepared an implementation plan and a human resources placement procedure approved 
by the University Managing Board. Both the plan and the procedure were widely communicated to 
the university community through meetings, notice boards and distribution of the documents to each 
organizational unit/process. Nomination and placement of employees and officers, took about 
eighteen months to finalize.  The Change Management Committee undertook multiple BPR follow-up 
meetings, on average once every 20 days, for about 18 months.  Some 60 percent of meeting time and 
decisions were related to placement of employees, nomination of officials, and handling of 
grievances. Less than five per cent of meeting time focused on review of the implementation plan. No 
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major progress reports were made, no follow up of prior reviews was conducted, and no plan 
revisions were done. After a year and six months, the implementation plan was not revised or 
improved.  There was, however, a two-day observation of BPR progress conducted by external 
consultants.  
BDC’s redesign of Land Acquisition and Administration reduced the previous 62 activities in 
the process to just 11. The new process is customer-focused, orientated to results rather than activities, 
and employees are expected to work with team spirit. Each employee is given the authority to process 
leasehold bids to finality. The time to complete delivery of land on a lease basis, the preparation of 
site plans, and the processing of construction permits, is down from 529 days to just 20.  
 The city services developed the implementation plan of BPR in line with the general regional 
government strategic plan. This document was communicated to all City Services Office employees. 
A team comprising the Mayor, the Process Owner and the head of the capacity-building office was set 
up by the regional government to monitor re-engineering.   
The new Land Acquisition and Administration process allowed one-stop-shop service 
delivery – for all activities starting with request for land to the provision of construction permits to 
residents and investors. The decision points are the case worker/expert or case manager or process 
owner, without additional reference to the Mayor’s Office or the City Manager’s Office. The 17 
kebeles are reorganized as 9 sub-city administration units which take responsibility for granting 
construction permits and title deed transfers for buildings and collecting fees from citizens. Time 
taken for acquisition of construction permits for plots obtained on open bid went down from 12 
months to an average of 14 days. The Change Management Committee ran weekly, monthly and 
quarterly review meetings to assess challenges and remedy legal frameworks in conflict with the BPR 
designs.  However, after nine months the review tempo slowed and performance declined.  
 
The following section presents the results of the survey on the level of implementation of 
PBR. 
1. Assessment of the level of implementation of BPR in the two offices  
Respondents from BDU and BDC were asked to assess the level of PBR implementation 
through five main indicators with 39 sub indicators. The main indicators were: result areas and goals, 
objectives, measurement and reviews, responsibilities, continuous improvement (see Annex 1 for the 
questions and the responses). Table 1 provides the summary of the results. 
 
Table 1:  Summary of survey result 
Note:  
1. The percentages indicate the proportion of respondents who have positively and negatively 
assessed the level of BPR implementation.  
 
2. The detailed survey result for each of the items is given in Annex 1 
a) Result areas and goals: measureable unit goals linked to the overall vision of the 
organization are an indicator of proper implementation. It is essential to have clearly defined and 
understood goals and result areas (Hacker and Washington, 2004). The scores in Table 1 indicate that 
both the university and city services did well in these respects, and this was reaffirmed by interviews 
 
Item 
Less Favourable Favourable Mean 
BDU (%) City 
(%) 
BDU (%) City 
(%) 
BDU City 
1 
Result Areas And Goals 19 41 73 34 4.89 3.99 
2 Objectives 24 48 61 31 4.87 3.70 
3 Measurement Processes 75 63 14 17 2.46 3.35 
4 Reviews 54 59 26 21 3.46 3.37 
5 Responsibilities 39 46 41 23 4.1 3.69 
6 Continuous Improvement 88 70 6 14 1.96 3.03 
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with the top management of the two organizations. The BDC implementation plan also indicates the 
major goals, measures, targets, and bodies responsible for the different goals, though it does not show 
the different input requirements crucial for the success of the BPR project. For example, office, ICT 
and budget requirements are not indicated.  
b) Objectives: another main indicator is when organizational goals guide organizational unit 
objectives, and unit objectives guide functional tactics or operational plans. Implementation of BPR is 
all about the “how”,  which involves translating strategic goals in to annual objectives, cascading 
them into all organizational units, including to employees,  and ensuring resource provision (Hamel 
and Prahald, 2005; Kaplan and Norton, 2008). The survey result indicated that both the University 
and the City services office scored above average results in crafting well-defined objectives. There 
are, however, no documents support the survey result. The interviewees at both offices also contended 
that organizational objectives were not cascaded down across all units; organizational plans were not 
sufficiently aligned with organizational units and the objectives of each unit were not linked with the 
overall vision of the organizations. Although cascading helps to pass on organizational accountability 
to all units for the results they achieve, and to measure and evaluate their performance, this is not 
done adequately in either organization.  
c). Measurement processes: both the BDU and BDC scored below the benchmark point of 3.5 
(the mean score), showing their weakness in designing systems to measure the performance of the 
implementation process. During interview, an official from the university admitted that the university 
did not consider the measurement system while preparing the planning documents. As a result, the 
performance of the implementation plan was not – could not be – measured. Among reasons cited for 
this omission was that the President, Vice Presidents and Process Owners were preoccupied in daily 
routines and other priorities like ‘emergency or urgent’ assignments from higher political bodies and 
negotiations with service providers. BDC did not have their own measurement plans, but followed a 
system established by the regional government.   
d) Review processes: both university and city scored below average on the availability of a 
well-designed review process. The university did conduct occasional reviews, but these were limited 
to the hearing of progress reports and presentations of challenges faced by the process owners. No 
organized quarterly reports were produced, no follow-ups from previous reviews were heard, no term 
plans were prepared, and clear accountability was not mentioned. Most change management meeting 
time (60% of the agenda for more than eighteen months) was about the placement of employees and 
handling of employee grievances rather than the performance of the implementation process. The 
university also struggled for lack of legal frameworks to support the new processes; the financial 
management and procurement and property administration proclamations enacted by the federal 
government reduced BDU’s autonomy and flexibility in implementing BPR projects and reviewing 
the processes.  
BDC, however, showed improvement in the delivery of services because it was led by 
regulations, emanating from the regional government, that supported the new designs and empowered 
managers at all levels. During the first six months of implementation (in 2008)  BDC held daily 
review meetings at unit level with employees, weekly meetings with management and monthly 
meetings with the mayor’s office. In those meetings, decisions important for the smooth-functioning 
of the new design— like amendment of rules, procedures, formats and other matters -  were made by 
management. But this review process was not sustained and the office’s delivery of services declined. 
Reasons for decline included the office’s inability to develop and implement employees’ performance 
measurement and incentive systems, and the frequent turnover of management before the system was 
institutionalized. The Federal and regional labour laws do not allow for performance-based benefit 
packages (see, for example, FDRE (2004) proclamation No. 377/2003).  The regional government’s 
top political leaders, ‘who lacked trust in the middle and lower managers of the city service offices’, 
(interview) took back the discretionary power given to BDC. This situation not only stalled progress 
but also frustrated regular employees and process owners and led to high turnover of employees.   
At BDU, the managing board replaced the President, three Vice Presidents, and four Process 
Owners during the implementation stage. Similarly, in BDC the Mayor, the City Manager and other 
city administration cabinet members were replaced. This turnover of top functionaries was mainly for 
political reasons. It disrupted implementation of BPR projects. Moreover, in the case study offices, 
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there were no continuous review meetings which led to loss of strategic direction while management 
was immersed in what one interviewee labeled ‘irrelevant, minor daily routines’.  
e) Responsibilities:  Both organizations under study scored high in terms of having well-
defined responsibilities. This shows that responsibilities were fixed to the persons assigned for the 
different duties.  
f) Evidence of continuous improvement: the survey scores and interviews reflect little   
continuous improvement in either the BDU or BDC – because there was no measurement system, no 
data, and review was inadequate.  
 
These results (Table 1) indicate weaknesses on items related to the monitoring, evaluation and 
revision of the implementation process. Measurement systems should include determining what to 
measure, identifying proper data collection methods, and collecting the data. Review systems are 
essential to determine whether different organizational activities are achieving desired results and 
whether new decisions should be made.  Continuous improvements are extensions of the review 
systems and indicate the ability/willingness/diligence to redirect when the situation demands.  
 
Conclusion 
Aligning large-scale change initiatives to organizational mission and vision, designing 
strategic plans accordingly and installing robust measurement systems would greatly improve the 
effectiveness of these change projects. Since change projects such as BPR require huge amounts of 
time, budget and manpower, it is crucial that organizations monitor the performance of strategic 
initiatives through measurement systems that enable them to continuously learn and improve.  
The organizations under study are good at designing, but find execution of those designs a 
major problem. Shortfalls include leadership commitment and continuity, alignment of organizational 
objectives to lower-level units, and understanding of employee intentions or resistances, and 
translating nominal responsibility into practical accountability. The following points indicate the 
major issues that transpired from the discussion in this chapter:  
 While Planning, both strategic and operational, is perceived by top management as very 
important in leading organizations, not enough is done to ensure measurement systems 
for the plan, monitoring the plan and continuously improving the strategic initiatives and 
operational activities. 
 High turnover of officials, especially at the top level, breaks continuity and demands 
countervailing hand-over and replacement mechanisms.  
 ICT is an essential enabler for successful BPR, but it is given little attention while 
implementing BPR projects. . 
 New processes demand the design and execution of performance measurement systems 
alongside incentive structures.  
 Public offices shy away from change management efforts when there is a perception by 
management that the change process is a political project.   
 Persistent and diverse communication strategies are vital for selling a change agenda; 
successful change begins with acquiring employees’ buy-in to the strategic plan and 
change process.   
 
Notes 
1. Though the Hacker and Washington (2004) instrument was used by the authors in a sub-
Saharan country, Botswana, a focus group discussion about the validity of the questionnaire 
and practical applicability of the instrument in the Ethiopian context with three middle level 
officials indicated the need for a few adjustments - like reducing the variables from 42 to 39 
and changing the names of organizational units to the current organizational contexts under 
study.  (Please see the slightly modified questionnaire in Annex 1. For the original version of 
the questionnaire developed by Hacker and Washington (2004) please visit Hacker, M. and 
Washington, M. (2004), How we measure the implementation of large-scale change, 
Measuring Business Excellence, Vol. 8 No. 3page 56.)  
1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal               - Proceedings- 
96 
 
References: 
Abdolvand, N., Albadvi, A. and Ferdowsi, Z. 2008. Assessing readiness for business process re-
engineering. Business Process Management Journal,  Vol.  14 No. 4, pp.497–511. 
Attaran, M. 2000. Why does re-engineering fail? A practical guide for successful implementation. 
Journal of Management Development, Vol. 19, No. 9, pp. 794–801.                                        
Cheng, T. and Chiu, I. 2008. Critical success factors of business process re-engineering in the banking 
industry. Knowledge and Process Management,  Vol. 15 No. 4, pp 258–269.  
Davis, D. 2000. Business research for decision making. 5
th
ed. Belmost, CA.: Duxbury Press.              
Debela, T., 2009. Business process re-engineering in Ethiopian public organizations: The relationship 
between theory and practice. Journal of Business and Administrative Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2.  
Debela, T. and Hagos, A. 2011. The design and implementation of BPR in the Ethiopian public 
sector: An assessment of four organizations. OSSREA: Addis Ababa.  
Dey, P. 2001. Re-engineering materials management: A case study on an Indian refinery. Business 
Process Management Journal, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 394–408. 
Eugene, A. H., Rosenthal J., W. and Judy,  1994. How to make re-engineering really work.  
Mckinsey Quarterly, Issue 2, pp. 107–128. 
Hacker, M. and Washington, M. 2004. How we measure the implementation of  large-scale change. 
Measuring Business Excellence, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 52–9. 
Hammer, M. and Stanton, S. 1995. The re-engineering revolution.  Harper Collins Publishers: New 
York. 
Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C. 2005. Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review, Vol. 83 Issue 
7/8, p148–161. 
Jayashree, P., and Hussain, S. J. 2011. Practitioner paper— Aligning change deployment: A Balanced 
scorecard approach. Measuring Business Excellence, Vol. 15, No. 3, PP 63–85. 
Kaplan, R. and Norton, D. 1996. The balanced scorecard: Translating strategy into action.  Boston, 
MA.: Harvard Business School Press. 
Kaplan, R. and Norton, D. 2008. The execution premium: Linking strategy to operations for 
competitive advantage. Boston, MA. : Harvard Business School Press. 
Linden, R.1994. Seamless government: A practical guide to re-engineering in the public sector. 
SanFrancisco, CA.: Josey-Bass Publishers. 
Linden, R.1998. Workbook for seamless government: A hands on guide to implementing 
organizational change. San Francisco,  CA.: Josey-Bass Publishers. 
Lockamy III, A. and Smith, W. 1997. A strategic alignment approach for effective business process 
re-engineering: Linking strategy, processes and customers for competitive advantage. International 
Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 141–153. 
McAdam, R., and Donaghy, J. 1999. Business process re-engineering in the public sector: A study of 
staff perceptions and critical success factors. Business  Process Management Journal, Vol. 5, No.1, 
pp. 33–52. 
FDRE. 2004. Negarit Gazzeta (2004), Labor Proclamation, No. 377 
Tekle Giorgis, H., and Amare, G. 2007. Success stories: Public sector capacity in Ethiopia. A 
consultancy report to Ministry of Capacity Building, Ethiopia. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2007. Ethiopia: Final evaluation of UNDP 
programme. 
Washington, M., and Hacker, M.  2005. Why change fails: Knowledge counts. Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, Vol. 26 No. 5, 2005, pp. 400––411. 
 
Web Sites Referred: 
Gebrekidan, A. 2011. Promoting and strengthening professionalism in the civil service: The Ethiopian 
case, A paper presented on the workshop on “promoting professionalism in  the public service: 
Strengthening the role of Human Resource Managers in the public sector for the effective 
implementation of the charter for public Service in Africa, 14–18 March 2011 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) 
accessed 13/01/2011.http://www.iss.nl/Media/Website/PUBLIC-Files/Academic-publications/5.-
Challenges-and-Prospects-of-Implementing-Public-Service-Delivery-Reform-PSDR-in-Ethiopia- by-
Yemane-Halefom-Gebre accessed 09/08/2011 
1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal               - Proceedings- 
97 
 
World Bank. 2011. Public sector capacity building programme support project: P074020 - 
Implementation status results report: Sequence 10. Accessed 15/09/2011 at worldbank.org/ 
external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=6418751
0&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=0000A8056_2011020408394461Ethiopia.  
 
 
Annex 1 
Survey result for each of the factors (own computation) 
 
1. Well-defined goals and result areas 
 
 Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar City services 
 Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
M SD Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
M S D 
Linked to the 
organization vision 
3 7 5.33 1.37 2 7 4.4 1.6
9 
Goals defined as 
appropriate 
3 7 5.17 1.27 2 5 3.9 1.0
2 
Cross office result 
areas identified as 
needed 
2 6 4.60 1.43 2 6 3.9 1.1
7 
Measurable 2 6 4.67 1.56 1 7 4.0 1.5
0 
Targets 2 7 4.67 1.61 2 7 3.9 1.2
7 
Total Mean   4.89    3.9
9 
 
 
2. Well-defined Objectives 
 
 Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar City services 
 
Min
imu
m 
Maxim
um 
M SD Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
M SD 
Linked to specific 
key result areas 
2 7 5.25 1.71 
1 7 3.4 1.50 
Strategies defined 
as needed 
1 7 4.50 1.98 
2 6 4.0 1.43 
Prioritized critical 
few 
1 7 3.91 2.07 
2 7 3.9 1.39 
Measurable 1 7 4.92 2.07 1 6 3.5 1.28 
Long term targets 2 7 5.33 1.44 2 6 3.9 1.31 
Annual Targets 2 7 5.33 1.37 2 6 3.7 1.28 
Total Mean   4.87    3.70  
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3. Well-defined measurement processes 
 
 Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar City services 
 Minimum Maximum M SD Minimum Maximum M SD 
Accepted 
measures 
1 7 3.58 1.73 1 6 3.2 1.28 
Understanding 
of measures 
1 6 3.17 1.53 1 6 3.2 1.24 
Reliable data 
sources 
1 5 2.42 1.38 2 5 3.3 1.02 
Reliable 
survey 
mechanics 
1 5 2.17 1.40 1 6 3.4 1.23 
Plotted as 
time series 
1 5 1.92 1.38 1 7 3.5 1.50 
Control 
charted 
1 6 2.08 1.62 2 7 3.6 1.32 
Special causes 
investigated 
1 5 2.18 1.33 1 6 3.2 1.15 
Control limits 
revised as 
appropriate 
1 6 2.09 1.76 2 6 3.3 1.25 
Data 
interpretations 
accurate 
1 7 2.55 2.16 1 7 3.5 1.54 
Random 
variations 
understood 
 
1 
 
5 
 
2.45 
 
1.63 
2 7 3.4 1.39 
Total Mean   2.46    3.35  
 
4. Well-established review processes 
 
 
Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar City services 
Minimu
m 
Maxi
mum 
M SD Minimu
m 
Maxi
mum 
M SD 
Quarterly reviews 
conducted with PS* 
1 7 3.75 1.7
6 
1 6 3.1 1.2
3 
Monthly reviews 
conducted with 
department heads 
2 5 2.91 .94 1 5 3.2 1.0
4 
Status reports 
generated 
2 6 3.92 1.3
8 
1 6 3.7 1.3
5 
Follow up from 
previous reviews 
1 7 3.91 1.7
0 
1 6 3.1 1.5
2 
Lessons learned 
discussed 
1 5 3.10 1.6
0 
1 6 3.3 1.2
9 
Discussions include 
plans for next 
quarter and longer 
1 7 3.17 2.0
4 
1 7 3.5 1.5
8 
Performance 
accountability 
exists 
1 7 3.50 2.2
0 
2 7 3.9 1.4
9 
Total Mean   3.46    3.37  
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5. Well-defined Responsibilities 
 
 
Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar City services 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
M SD Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
M S 
To Vice 
Presidents* 
1 7 4.18 1.72 1 7 3.6 1.79 
Process 
Owners 
1 7 4.25 1.76 2 7 3.7 1.35 
Deans/Directo
rs 
1 7 4.25 1.86 1 7 3.5 1.47 
Case team 
coordinators 
1 7 4.17 1.85 2 7 3.8 1.16 
Case team 
workers 
1 6 3.67 1.87 1 7 3.9 1.29 
Total Mean   4.10    3.69  
6. Evidence of continuous improvement  
 Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar City services 
Minimum Maximum M SD Minimum Maximum M SD 
PMS* annually 
assessed 
1 6 2.83 1.85 1 5 3.0 0.92 
Change efforts of 
work units aligned 
with key result 
areas 
1 5 2.33 1.50 1 6 3.1 1.27 
Training on PMS 
conducted broadly 
and systematically 
1 3 1.67 .89 1 7 2.9 1.54 
New employees 
trained in PMS 
1 3 1.50 .85 1 7 2.9 1.59 
Communication 
plans keep 
organizations 
aware of the status 
of PMS 
1 4 1.75 .97 1 7 3.1 1.58 
Internal PMS 
benchmarking 
across all 
organizational 
units 
1 3 1.67 .98 1 5 3.2 1.08 
Total Mean   1.96    3.03  
*Note: PMS stands for performance measurement systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
